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The Value of Emissions Trading
Mort Webster, Sergey Paltsev and John Reilly
Abstract
This paper estimates the value of international emissions trading, focusing attention on a here-to-fore
neglected component: its value as a hedge against uncertainty. Much analysis has been done of the Kyoto
Protocol and other potential international greenhouse gas mitigation policies comparing the costs of
achieving greenhouse gas emission targets with and without trading. These studies often show large cost
reductions for all Parties under trading compared to a no trading case. We investigate the welfare gains of
including emissions trading in the presence of uncertainty in economic growth rates, using both a partial
equilibrium model based on marginal abatement cost curves and a computable general equilibrium model
that allows consideration of the interaction of emissions trading with existing energy taxes and changes in
terms of trade. We find that the hedge value of international trading is small relative to its value in
reallocating emissions reductions when, as in the Kyoto Protocol, the burden-sharing scheme does not
resemble a least-cost allocation. The Kyoto Protocol also allocated excess allowances to Russia, so-called
“hot air,” and much of the value often attributed to emissions trading stems from other Parties having access
to these extra allowances, which has the effect of lowering the aggregate emissions target. We also find that
the effects of preexisting tax distortions and terms of trade dominate the hedge value of trading. We conclude
that the primary value of emissions trading in international agreements is as a burden-sharing or wealth
transfer mechanism and should be judged accordingly.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The design and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol includes emissions trading as one of its
primary elements (United Nations, 1997). Much analysis has been done of the Protocol and other
potential greenhouse gas mitigation policies comparing the costs of achieving greenhouse gas
emission targets with and without trading (Babiker et al., 2002; Manne and Richels, 1999;
Weyant and Hill, 1999). These studies often show large cost reductions for all Parties under
trading compared to a no trading case. Our contention is that emissions trading has “value” in
such studies because the targets assigned to different countries either intentionally or accidentally
redistributed the cost burden of the reductions among the Parties. In our view, the value
estimated in such studies is not the value of emissions trading as a policy instrument per se but is
more appropriately thought of as the savings from allowing a reallocation from an initial burden
sharing agreement to a least cost allocation. This leads to our interest in estimating the additional
value of emission trading as a hedge against uncertainty. The “hedge value” results from the fact
2that countries are uncertain about their future emissions growth. Thus, even if the negotiated
targets were such that the expected level of net trade was zero, one might expect that there would
be a positive expected value of trade because of uncertainty.
The logic for positive expected value when the expected net trade is zero is straightforward:
partial equilibrium analysis of emissions trading shows that all parties benefit from trade,
whether they are a buyer or a seller. The worst outcome from having the trading option available
is that ex post it has a zero value. Thus, the ex ante expected value of trade across uncertain
outcomes is necessarily positive. This value of international emissions trading more closely
corresponds to the equivalent domestic case for emissions trading, where the regulator has poor
information on the relative abatement opportunities among different firms. Trading allows the
market to correct an initial misallocation by the regulator of reduction targets among firms.
The conventional analyses of the Kyoto Protocol, conducted under certainty, do not capture this
value of emissions trading at all.
Our goal is to estimate the hedge value of international emissions trading for greenhouse gas
abatement. We develop a stochastic model of emissions growth (and thus abatement cost).
We assign Parties a target so that net trade is zero in the case where all parameter values of the
abatement model are at their expected value levels. We then simulate the model for hundreds of
different parameter sets drawn from probability density functions that drive emissions growth.
For each parameter set we simulate the policy with and without emissions trading. Comparing
the welfare cost of the trading and no trading case for each parameter set provides an estimate of
the value of trade for each realization of the world. The expected value of trade is the mean of
this distribution of benefits.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model, the data on uncertain
parameters, and the policy cases we investigate. We use Section 3 to provide a benchmark with
the conventional literature on the value of emissions trading, by comparing aggregate costs with
and without trading when parameters of the model we use are simulated as if known with
certainty. In Section 4, we develop a Marginal Abatement Curve (MAC) model to examine the
value of trading under uncertainty in this simple framework. Section 5 then provides a stochastic
analysis using a global CGE model where we investigate the value of emissions trading when
mitigation policy interacts with existing energy taxes and also affects the terms of trade.
Section 6 summarizes the results and discusses the policy relevance of them.
2. MODEL, DATA, AND POLICY CASES
The Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005), a
computable general equilibrium model of the world economy, is used both to estimate a marginal
abatement curve model, and for simulations where we use it directly. EPPA Version 4 is a
component of the MIT Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM), developed to enable detailed
studies of the effects of climate policies (Prinn et al., 1999; Sokolov et al., 2005). The main
advantage of CGE models is their ability to capture the influence of a sector-specific (e.g.,
energy, fiscal, or agricultural) policy on other industry sectors, on consumption, and also on
3international trade. EPPA is a recursive-dynamic and multi-regional model covering the entire
world economy. It is built on the economic and energy data from the GTAP dataset (Dimaranan
and McDougall, 2002; Hertel, 1997). It has been used extensively for the study of climate policy
(Babiker et al., 2002; Jacoby et al., 1997; McFarland et al., 2004; Paltsev et al., 2003; Reilly et
al., 2002; Viguier et al., 2003), climate/multi-gas interactions (Felzer et al., 2004; Hyman et al.,
2003; Reilly et al., 1999), and to study uncertainty in emissions and climate projections for
climate models (Webster et al., 2002; Webster et al., 2003). Table 1 provides an overview of the
basic elements of the model, with greater details in Paltsev et al. (2005).
One of the primary drivers of uncertainty in emissions and abatement costs is the uncertainty
in economic growth rates (Webster et al., 2002). In EPPA, different rates of economic growth
can be simulated by assuming different rates of labor productivity growth. A historical analysis
of variability in GDP growth rates between 1960 and 2000 (Webster and Cho, 2006), provides a
basis for constructing probability distributions for the labor productivity growth parameters.
They fit probability distributions to the historical data for individual countries and for aggregate
model regions, in annual and 5-year time steps. We used the variability of average annual growth
Table 1. Countries, Regions, and Sectors in the EPPA Model.
Country or Region Sectors Factors
Developed
   United States (USA)
   Canada (CAN)
   Japan (JPN)
   European Union+a (EUR)
   Australia & New Zealand (ANZ)
   Former Soviet Unionb (FSU)
   Eastern Europe (EET)
Developing
   India (IND)
   China (CHN)
   Indonesia (IDZ)
   Higher Income East Asiac (ASI)
   Mexico (MEX)
   Central & South America (LAM)
   Middle East (MES)
   Africa (AFR)
   Rest of Worldd (ROW)
Non-Energy
   Services (SERV)
   Energy-Intensive Products (EIT)
   Other Industries Products (OTHR)
   Transportation (TRAN)
   Agriculture (AGRI)
Energy
   Coal (COAL)
   Crude Oil (OIL)
   Refined Oil (ROIL)
   Natural Gas (GAS)
   Electric: Fossil (ELEC)
   Electric: Hydro (HYDR)
   Electric: Nuclear (NUCL)
   Electric: Solar and Wind (SOLW)
   Electric: Biomass (BIOM)
   Electric: Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC)
   Electric: NGCC with Sequestration (GGCAP)
   Electric: Integrated Gasification with
Combined Cycle and Sequestration (IGCAP)
   Oil from Shale (SYNO)
   Synthetic Gas (SYNG)
Capital
Labor
Land
Crude Oil Resources
Natural Gas Resources
Coal Resources
Hydro Resources
Shale Oil Resources
Nuclear Resources
Wind/Solar Resources
Emissions of Climate Relevant Substances
Substances
CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, SF6, PFCs, CFCs,
CO, NOx, SOx, VOCs, black carbon (BC),
organic carbon (OC), NH3
Sources
Combustion of refined oil, coal, gas, biofuels and biomass
burning, manure, soils, paddy rice, cement, land fills, and
industrial production.
a The European Union (EU-15) plus countries of the European Free Trade Area (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland).
b Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
c South Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand.
d All countries not included elsewhere: Turkey, and mostly Asian countries.
4rates over 5-year periods, the time step of the EPPA model. Because projected growth rates
differ from average growth rates of the past, for the stochastic simulations, the distributions of
GDP growth were normalized for each region such that their median is equal to 1.0. Sample
values drawn from these normalized distributions are multiplied times the projected reference
labor productivity growth rate between the present (2005) and 2010. Table 2 shows the statistics
of the distribution of simulated annualized GDP growth. As shown, GDP growth rates in Canada
and the EUR region composed mostly of the EU-15 countries have been less variable than Japan.
GDP growth in the transition economies of Eastern Europe (EET) now part of the EU-25, and
the FSU has been most variable. Webster and Cho (2006) also estimated the correlations in
growth rates observed historically (Table 3), which we impose in the base runs.
We simulate three carbon mitigation policy cases to identify the separate effects of the Russian
allocation, the effect of differential allocation of allowances among the remaining Parties, and the
value of emissions trading as a hedge against uncertainty. In each, we focus on CO2-only cases.
The first case, Kyoto with (w/) FSU, approximates idealized implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
as it has currently gone into force, with participation by Canada (CAN), the EU (EUR), Japan
(JPN), Eastern European Countries (EET), and Russia and the other former Soviet Republics
(FSU).1 The United States (USA) and Australia (ANZ) are not constrained in this policy since
they have not ratified the Protocol. The emissions constraints have been modified to account for
credits for Article 3.4 carbon sinks negotiated at Bonn and Marrakech (United Nations, 1997).
The second case, Kyoto no FSU, excludes the FSU from emissions trading. Many European
countries have expressed a desire to meet caps without the Russian “hot air” and realistically
Russia may not succeed in setting up a domestic trading system in a timely manner. This may be
a more realistic, albeit, still relatively idealized implementation of the Protocol.
The third case, which we refer to as Cost-Effective, is constructed by reallocating allowances
in the Kyoto no FSU case such that there is no incentive to trade when simulating policy under
Table 2. Uncertainty in GDP Growth Rates: Projected Annual Growth Rate 2005-2010 (percentage).
CAN JPN EUR EET FSU
Lower 95% 1.4 0.9 1.4 –7.8 –6.0
Median 3.8 2.8 2.8 4.1 4.0
Mean 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.9
Upper 95% 6.2 6.5 6.4 11.2 12.0
Table 3. Historical Correlations in GDP Growth Rates.
CAN EUR EET FSU JPN
CAN 1.00
EUR 0.66 1.00
EET 0.68 0.27 1.00
FSU 0.71 0.64 0.47 1.00
JPN 0.54 0.76 0.14 0.60 1.00
                                                 
1 Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic states are part of the Kyoto Parties accepting caps. The other former republics are not
among the capped Parties, but they are not separately identifiable in the current version of the EPPA model.
5reference assumptions of the model; i.e., the autarkic carbon price is equal across regions.
Once uncertainty is introduced, emission growth deviates from the reference, marginal costs of
abatement differ, and regions have an incentive to trade. We are not claiming this expected-
equal-marginal-cost allocation to be necessarily a goal or a desirable outcome of political
negotiations. It is simply designed so that we can separately measure the hedge value of trading.
 Each of these policy cases is simulated with and without emissions trading, which we
designate with tr (trading) and ntr (no trading). For the uncertainty analysis, we focus on the
cases without the FSU, stochastically simulating them using both the partial equilibrium and
general equilibrium model. We then investigate the interactions of climate policy with tax
distortions, by developing a case where we remove existing fuel tax distortions. Recent work
(Babiker et al., 2004; Paltsev et al., 2004) has shown that trading may not be beneficial to Parties
in the presence of tax distortions, a result we find here as well, and this case helps to resolve
differences between the partial and general equilibrium results. Finally, we consider cases that
test the sensitivity of results to the correlation of growth among countries. While we have an
estimate of correlation from Webster and Cho (2006) the statistical significance of it is weak, and
with changing international relations (e.g., integration of the EET states into the EU) the
historical correlation is likely a poor guide to the future.
3. THE CONVENTIONAL CASE: EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER CERTAINTY
We simulate an EPPA reference and the three policy cases, with and without international
emissions trading using the EPPA model. Resulting carbon prices and consumption changes are
reported in Table 4. We show total consumption for each case and the change in consumption
between each trading and respective no-trade case. Much of the gain from emissions trading
under Case 1, Kyoto with FSU, is the hot air itself. By lowering the aggregate abatement by nearly
230 MtC of carbon, the total costs of abatement across participating nations are necessarily lower.
Russia also undertakes real abatement of 83 MtC from its reference emissions. The welfare gain
from allowing emissions trading aggregated across all participating regions is $106 billion when
the FSU is included, while the welfare gain from emissions trading under Kyoto without the FSU
is $26 billion.2 Much of this $80 billion difference is the savings from lowering the aggregate
emissions target. The carbon price in the Kyoto with FSU-tr case is $25/tC, compared with
$142/tC in the Kyoto no FSU-tr case, the difference reflecting the hot air and addition of low cost
abatement options in the FSU. We verify that the Cost-Effective-tr and Cost-Effective-ntr are
identical, producing the same carbon price in each region without trading as with, and with no
impact on consumption. The autarkic cases show CAN with the highest carbon price at $225/tC,
JPN and EUR both somewhat below $200/tC, and the EET with an $18/tC price.
                                                 
2 EPPA is based on the GTAP-E data base, and all regional economies are denominate in US $ at base year (1997)
exchange rates, and all commodities, including emissions permits, are traded at these exchange rates. Aggregate
benefits are summed across regions in US dollar as denominated in the model. A further issue, not explored here,
is the aggregation of welfare measures across regions using exchange rates. In principle, a real purchasing power
index, such as the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) index should be used to make such cross country comparisons.
We abstract from that issue here but these PPP differentials represent another violation of the perfectly
competitive and idealized market conditions of this simple case, part of which we take up in the next section.
6Table 4. Welfare Impacts of Kyoto Policy under Certainty.
Case CAN JPN EUR EET FSU TOTAL
Welfare Reference 641 3372 7654 293 636 12597
(Consumption) Kyoto w/FSU-ntr 634 3357 7559 293 634 12476
($Billion) Kyoto w/FSU-tr 639 3370 7637 293 643 12582
Kyoto no FSU-ntr 634 3357 7559 293 634 12476
Kyoto no FSU-tr 635 3361 7575 298 634 12502
Cost-effective-ntr 637 3362 7581 289 634 12502
Cost-effective-tr 637 3362 7581 289 634 12502
Gain from Kyoto w/FSU 5.8 12.7 77.9 0.4 9.1 106
Emissions Trading Kyoto no FSU 1.2 3.5 15.8 5.4 0.0 26
(tr-ntr) ($B) Cost-effective 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Carbon Price Kyoto w/FSU-ntr 225 199 183 18 0
($/ton) Kyoto w/FSU-tr 25 25 25 25 25
Kyoto no FSU-ntr 225 199 183 18 0
Kyoto no FSU-tr 142 142 142 142 0
Cost-effective-ntr 142 142 142 142 0
Cost-effective-tr 142 142 142 142 0
4. EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
ESTIMATES
Figure 1 offers a simple diagrammatic analysis of the standard partial equilibrium analysis
that underlies the expectation that the hedge value of emissions trading should be positive. As
shown, Country A has a marginal abatement cost of PA and Country B has a marginal abatement
cost of PB. When emission trading is introduced, the international carbon price is PW. At this
price, A will buy QA permits in order to reduce its abatement level and B will sell QB permits
and increase its abatement by that amount. The total abatement cost to A falls by a1+a2, and the
cost of buying permits is a2, resulting in a net gain of area a1. The total abatement cost to B
increases by b2, but since revenue from the permit sales is b1+b2 there is a net gain of b1. The
worst possible outcome of trading in this situation is no gain when a Country’s autarkic price is
the same as the world price with trading, and the country thus is neither a net buyer nor seller.
Figure 1. Graphical Description of Partial Equilibrium Gain from Emissions Trading.
7We develop a partial equilibrium model based on Marginal Abatement Curves (MACs),
following the approach of (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998) and others, to examine the hedge value
of emissions trading in this simple case. The MACs are third-order polynomial fits of 40
simulations of abatement ranging from 1% to 40% reduction below the reference in 2010
(Figure 2). To simulate uncertainty in emissions, we sample from the uncertainty in growth rates
for all regions based on the historical variability described in Section 2. Latin Hypercube
sampling (Iman and Helton, 1988; Iman and Conover, 1982), a stratified sampling method
shown to be more efficient than random sampling, was used to construct 250 simulations. EPPA
is used to project the 250 growth samples under the Kyoto no FSU case with and without trading
and the Cost-Effective case with and without trading. Differences in growth rates result different
reference emissions, which therefore changes the amount of abatement required to achieve the
fixed target and the cost of that abatement. With shifts in abatement costs of all regions, the
number of permits bought/sold will vary correspondingly. The resulting changes in CO2 for each
region as calculated by EPPA between the no-trade and the trading cases are used in conjunction
with the MAC curves to calculate the net gain from emissions trading.
The partial equilibrium estimates of the gains from emissions trading are calculated for these
four regions and summed (Table 5). The gain from trade under the Cost-Effective case is a
measure of the hedge value of emissions trading, which under this case we find to be about $2.4
Figure 2. Marginal Abatement Cost Curves Derived from EPPA Model.
Table 5. Uncertainty Estimates of Gains from Trading: Partial Equilibrium Results ($ Billion 1997 US).
Case EUR JPN EET CAN TOTAL
Kyoto no FSU Lower 95% 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 1.8
Mean 1.0 0.7 4.6 0.7 7.0
Upper 95% 2.9 3.3 10.4 1.5 15.3
Cost-Effective Lower 95% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Mean 0.3 0.4 1.5 0.1 2.4
Upper 95% 1.3 1.3 7.0 0.4 8.9
8billion, the mean estimate. The 95% probability range is from $0.1 to $8.9 billion. The Kyoto no
FSU case has mean gains from trade of $7.0 billion (95% range of $1.8 to $15.3 billion). As
expected no region is ever worse off with trading. The hedge value of trading is a relatively small
component of the total value of trading in this case, at the mean value it is about one-third. The
hedge value that we derive from the MAC model reflects the uncertainty distribution. The more
uncertain the emissions, the greater the hedge value of trading. The range is fairly wide because
there are some cases in the sample where some regions have very high growth while others have
low, and thus trading is particularly valuable. However, these results suggest that it is the
redistribution goals implicit in the Kyoto Protocol that give greater value to trading than
uncertainty in growth of emissions. This is true even in comparison with the Kyoto no FSU case.
Kyoto with FSU has even stronger implicit redistribution goals.
The value of trading estimated with the partial equilibrium model is much smaller than the
value of trading simulated with the CGE model under certainty. In those we found the value of
trade to be $26 billion ($106 billion under Kyoto with FSU), and these did not include a hedge
value. The MAC costs, derived from integrating under the marginal abatement curves, and the
welfare cost computed from the CGE model would not be expected to be identical because the
CGE results include feedback effects. As shown elsewhere, pre-existing tax distortions can lead
to a large difference between the direct cost, the area under a MAC, and the estimated welfare
cost (Paltsev et al., 2004). We investigate this difference further in the Section 5.
Not surprisingly, the pattern of who buys and who sells emissions permits differs significantly
between these two policies (Figure 3). Under Kyoto no FSU, the probability of being a permit
seller for EUR, JPN, EET, and CAN are, respectively, 5%, 18%, 99%, 2%. The fact that the EET
is a permit seller in nearly all cases and JPN, EUR, and CAN are buyers in nearly all cases
reflects the burden redistribution aspects of the Kyoto Protocol that favored the EET. Under the
Cost-Effective case, the probability of being a net permit seller for EUR, JPN, EET,
Figure 3. Buyers and Sellers of Permits:  Partial Equilibrium Results.
9and CAN are, respectively, 59%, 60%, 42%, 35%, much closer to even odds of being either a
buyer or a seller. This reflects the allocation design where reference growth rates in all regions
will result in no trading.
5. EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
ESTIMATES
The partial equilibrium analysis provided a numerical test of the simple case made for
emissions trading—that it reduces the cost for both buyers and sellers of permits. As already
noted, the CGE estimates of trading gains in the certain case were much larger than the median
(or even the 95% upper limit) from the partial equilibrium analysis. Previous studies have shown
in simulations under reference conditions (i.e., certainty) that the economy-wide implications of
trading can differ from that for the individual firms that would be the direct buyers and sellers
due to the presence of tax distortions and terms-of-trade effects (Babiker et al., 2004; Paltsev et
al., 2004).
We turn now to results of stochastically simulating the CGE model to investigate emissions
trading where these distortions and other feedbacks exist. We again use Latin Hypercube
sampling from the distributions on GDP growth provided in Section 2. We translate these into
changes in the growth of labor productivity such that we reproduce the historical variability in
GDP in the forward forecasts. As noted in Section 2, we normalize the historical distributions
around the reference forecasts of the EPPA model. We again focus on the Kyoto no FSU and
Cost-Effective cases. In addition we include a case with the cost-effective allocation where we
remove all fuel taxes, which we label Cost-Effective-n.f.t. (no fuel tax).
Table 6 provides the key results. Here we see that the median gains from trade in Kyoto no
FSU are much closer to the estimate under certainty than with the partial equilibrium results.
Because of non-linearities, skewness of the distributions, and the imposed correlation structure
we would not expect the median or mean from this stochastic simulation of the CGE to be
exactly the same as when simulated under certainty with reference growth assumptions. The 95%
range for the aggregate gain is from about $0 to $60 billion. Even in this Kyoto no FSU case,
however, we see that in some cases EUR and JPN lose from emissions trading. In the Cost-
Table 6. Uncertainty Estimates of Effects of Trading: General Equilibrium Results ($Billion 1997 US).
Case CAN EUR JPN EET TOTAL
Kyoto no FSU Lower 95% 0.3 –2.0 –1.7 0.1 0.2
Median 1.3 12.7 2.3 4.3 21.5
Mean 1.3 13.7 3.6 4.8 23.3
Upper 95% 2.5 37.0 16.3 13.1 59.3
Cost-Effective Lower 95% –0.1 –14.9 –3.9 –0.1 –12.1
Median 0.1 –2.1 –0.7 0.6 –1.9
Mean 0.1 –0.5 0.2 1.2 1.1
Upper 95% 0.6 20.2 10.0 6.0 26.8
Cost-Effective n.f.t. Lower 95% –0.6 –4.4 –0.3 –0.6 –1.8
Median –0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.7
Mean 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.3
Upper 95% 1.0 6.0 1.2 3.9 8.0
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Effective case the likelihood of losses from emission trading occurs frequently enough in all
regions such that at the median there are net losses summing across the regions from emissions
trading with the 95% range from a loss of $12 billion to a gain of $27 billion. In the Cost-
Effective-n.f.t. case much of this strong tendency for emissions trading to cause welfare losses for
regions is eliminated. The median and mean effect is a small gain, $0.7 and $1.3 billion
respectively. At the same time, the distribution is much narrower. The 95% high end estimate
falls from $27 billion to $8 billion. Fuel taxes are particular high in EUR and JPN, and a main
benefit of emissions trading is to avoid those circumstances where EUR or JPN grow rapid
relative to other regions, forcing a high autarkic carbon price that greatly exacerbates the tax
interactions effect. Fitted probability density functions for the aggregated welfare impacts across
the four participating regions are shown in Figure 4.
The likelihood that trading results in a welfare loss is shown in Table 7. In the aggregate there
are losses in just 2% of the simulations in the Kyoto no FSU case, but the losses occur in 18% of
the simulations for JPN and 6% for EUR. However, when we try to estimate just the hedge value
of emissions trading we find that in more than one-half (58%) of the simulations in the Cost-
Effective case there is an aggregate loss from trade. This drops to 32% in the Cost-Effective n.f.t.
case, a smaller probability but far from a rare anomaly. This indicates that a substantial number
of the cases of welfare losses are the result of the tax effects.
Babiker et al. (2004) and Paltsev et al. (2004) also identify terms-of-trade effects as
potentially important. Because the terms-of-trade change endogenously in the model we are not
able to simply eliminate them as we did with fuel taxes. We thus examine changes in terms of
Figure 4. Welfare Impacts of Emissions Trading under Uncertainty (General Equilibrium Estimate).
Table 7. Probability that Trading Reduces Welfare: General Equilibrium Results (percentage).
Case CAN EUR JPN EET TOTAL
Kyoto no FSU 0 6 18 1 2
Cost-Effective 30 59 60 11 58
Cost-Effective-n.f.t. 62 38 27 50 32
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trade by relating these to losses and gains from emissions trading. Figure 5 shows the probability
distribution of the change in the terms of trade when trading is allowed. Under the Kyoto no FSU
policy, the permit buyers (EUR, JPN, CAN) experience a decrease in the terms of trade of up to
a half of a percent, and the permit seller (EET) experiences an improvement in the terms of trade.
Under the Cost-Effective case, regions are roughly equally likely to experience a gain or loss in
their terms of trade. The size of this effect is relatively small, less than a percent for EUR, JPN,
and CAN and up to two or three percent for EET.
We plot the change in welfare measured as the change in consumption against the change in
terms of trade in Figure 6 for each region for the Cost-Effective-n.f.t. case. This case eliminates
other sources of disparity (i.e., fuel tax interactions) and thus comes closest to isolating the terms
of trade as a cause of the welfare change. EUR and CAN show a strong positive relationship:
losses (gains) in terms of trade are strongly associated with losses (gains) in consumption. The
relationship is very tight suggesting that the terms-of-trade effect strongly dominates any direct
benefits of emissions trading. The results for EET and JPN show a more complex relationship.
With large shocks in either direction (i.e., large terms-of-trade effects), there is a tendency for
consumption gains. Climate policy interactions with the terms-of-trade effect are complex,
affecting multiple export and import markets, and dependent on the specific trading relationships
and trading partners. Whether the terms-of-trade effect will dominate the direct cost effect of
carbon policy will also depend on how important trade is in a region’s economy. Each of the
realizations of the future represented in the 250 parameter sets is a unique combination of
differential growth rates among the regions.
It is perhaps surprising that the “indirect” terms-of-trade effect can dominate the “direct”
effect of emissions trading. A primary reason for this is likely a feedback effect on the domestic
economy from terms-of-trade changes caused by emissions trading among other regions.
Consider the case where, for example, EET’s autarkic price is exactly at the world trading price.
Figure 5. Impacts of Emissions Trading on Terms of Trade Relative: Terms of Trade in the
Trading Case Compared with the No Trading Case.
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Figure 6. Relationship between Change in Terms of Trade and Change in Welfare from
Allowing Emissions Trading (Cost-Effective-n.f.t.)
In this circumstance, the direct benefit from trade is necessarily zero because net trade would be
zero. However, suppose other regions have an incentive to trade. Opening emissions trading
would thus affect the international prices of goods, including those for EET’s exports and
imports even though there was no direct effect of emissions trading on EET’s economy. As this
example is constructed, the terms-of-trade change is the only economic change affecting the
EET. Any welfare change thus will be completely determined by the change in the terms of
trade. The allocation in the Cost Effective-n.f.t. case is set so that countries will often have only
small incentives to trade. Only in those cases where the region’s autarkic price is far from the
world price will there be a big “direct” welfare gain from trading. And, only in these
circumstances is it likely that the direct gains from trading can dominate the indirect terms-of-
trade effect. The EET and JPN, regions where the relationship between the terms-of-trade change
and the consumption loss is more complex, are also those regions where simulated growth is
more variable, as discussed in Section 2 and shown in Table 2.
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It is useful to compare the general equilibrium results under uncertainty to those from the
partial equilibrium analysis. The change in total abatement costs under partial equilibrium for
trading in the Cost-Effective policy had a mean and 95% lower and upper bounds, respectively,
of $2.4, $0.1, and $8.9 billion. The general equilibrium welfare impact has a mean of close to
$1 billion with or without tax distortions, and 95% ranges from –$12 to $27 billion with existing
fuel taxes and from –$2 to $8 when we remove fuel taxes. Distortions and terms-of-trade effects
captured in the general equilibrium analysis result in emissions trading producing net welfare
losses for individual regions and the sum across regions in many cases. In fact, the median hedge
value of trade is negative in the Cost-Effective case and nearly zero in the Cost-Effective-n.f.t.
case, thus for half or more of the cases emissions trading is welfare worsening. The presence of
tax distortions also greatly increases the variance. In the Kyoto no FSU case, the total value of
trade (included the hedge value and the burden redistribution effects) is much larger in the
general equilibrium analysis (mean of $22 billion, 95% range of $0.2 to $59 billion) than in the
partial equilibrium analysis (mean of $7 billion, 95% range of $2 to $15 billion). This occurs
because under the conditions of this policy simulation, trading often means that EUR and JPN
are permit buyers, and they thus avoid causing further tax distortion losses.
The results presented so far are based on imposing correlations among growth as observed
over the period 1960-2000. The statistical significance of these correlations were relatively weak,
and there are reasons to believe that these correlations may not apply in the future. We thus
compare the results with historical correlations to the same policies simulated with growth rates
sampled assuming no correlation (probabilistically independent) and with a very strong
correlation of 0.90. These correlations are imposed pairwise between every pairing of the four
regions where the policy constraints are imposed. We show in Table 8 the results only for the
Cost-Effective-n.f.t. case, as the effects of correlation are similar across policies. The effect of
different correlations on the mean welfare change is negligible, and the effect on the extremes of
the distribution is that weaker correlation causes more uncertainty in welfare change (longer
tails). The effect of correlation on other variables is similar to that of welfare. Thus, our overall
conclusion is that even with extreme assumptions about correlation the main results of our study
are little affected.
Table 8. Sensitivity of General Equilibrium Results to Correlation of GDP Growth Among Regions
(Cost-Effective-n.f.t.) ($Billion 1997 US).
CAN EUR JPN EET
Lower 95% Uncorrelated –0.7 –5.7 –0.2 –0.7
Historical –0.6 –4.4 –0.3 –0.6
Correlation = 0.9 –0.5 –2.6 –0.2 –1.2
Mean Uncorrelated 0.2 1.2 0.8 0.9
Historical 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.4
Correlation = 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.1 –0.1
Upper 95% Uncorrelated 2.6 10.8 3.7 6.2
Historical 1.0 6.0 1.2 3.9
Correlation = 0.9 1.7 6.3 0.6 1.4
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have estimated what we refer to as the hedge value of international emissions
trading as a greenhouse gas mitigation policy instrument. In our definition, this is the value of
trade as a cushion against uncertainty in emissions growth. Previous estimates of the value of
trade have estimated its value under certainty, in the context of the Kyoto emissions targets.
Much of this value resulted from Russian “hot air” that effectively lowered the aggregate
emissions target by, in our reference case, 230 MtC. Trading under certainty with the FSU
included has a value, summed across regions, of $106 billion, much of this due to the fact that it
increases the allowances available to all parties by the hot air amount. Removing the FSU
reduces the value to $26 billion. We find the hedge value of emissions trading to be small in
comparison. From the partial equilibrium analysis, the mean value was $2.4 billion with a range
of $0.1 to $9 billion. When we estimated the hedge value by stochastically simulating a general
equilibrium model, we found strong interactions of the climate policy with preexisting fuel taxes
and terms-of-trade effects. These interactions meant that emissions trading could often be
welfare worsening, and thus the hedge value (the mean value in our stochastic simulation) was
even smaller (about $1 billion) than in the partial equilibrium analysis. With the current levels of
fuel taxes left in place, more than half of the cases (58%) resulted in a net welfare loss summed
across the regions. With fuel taxes removed, 32% of cases result in a net welfare loss in the
aggregate. The distortion and terms-of-trade effect also greatly increase the variance of the value
of emissions trading.
The value of international emissions trading and its components identified in this paper
(hedge value, burden redistribution, tax interaction, and terms-of-trade effects) obviously
strongly depend on the specific circumstances of the trading participants. The hedge value
depends on the uncertainty in emissions forecasts, conditions specific to individual regions.
We used historical variability in growth rates to estimate likely future variability for these
regions. The burden redistribution value of trade obviously depends on the initial allowance
allocation. Fuel taxes vary among countries, and terms-of-trade effects depend on particular
exports and imports and the geographic patterns of trade. We also emphasize that we would
expect much different results for the value of trading in a domestic context, where trading is
among individual firms or entities, rather than among countries as we have simulated here.
Our suspicion is that the hedge value in the domestic trading context may be much larger
because of the scope for large and unexpected changes in emissions for individual entities.
Thus, the lessons from domestic trading systems may not necessarily transfer to international
trading systems or vice-versa.
We put particular focus on estimating the hedge value of emissions trading, a value that has
here-to-fore not been estimated for international greenhouse gas trading. We would argue that
the hedge value is most closely related to the pure value of trading as a policy instrument where
economic efficiency is the sole objective of policy design, and distributional effects of the policy
are ignored as economists would often like to do. Given the importance of the implications of the
distributional goals implicit in the Kyoto allocations for the value of trading, at least in the Kyoto
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Protocol as we have simulated it, it seems clear that this aspect of a negotiated agreement needs
to be a central consideration of economic analysis. From that perspective, the appeal of
emissions trading is that it allows equity/burden sharing considerations while allowing the
trading system to then re-establish a cost-effective solution—at least from a partial equilibrium
perspective that does not include general equilibrium effects where trading can be welfare
worsening.
Interestingly, our results suggest that if the redistribution of the burden is large, then we might
expect trading to be welfare improving, even if not optimal in the sense that further consideration
of tax effects and terms-of-trade effects could further improve the outcome. However, if trading
is among countries where each has an allocation that is likely to be close to the trading result
(little burden redistribution) then there is a good chance that trade can be welfare worsening.
Once recognizing that the primary use of international emissions trading is as a burden sharing or
wealth transfer device, concerns for the sustainability or self-reinforcing nature of the agreement
may lead one to question whether an emissions trading system is the best method for achieving
the redistribution goal.
While countries do what they do for many stated and unstated reasons, the US withdrawal
from the Kyoto Protocol likely reflected an unwillingness to go through with the burden sharing
agreement in the Protocol that would have involved considerable gain for Russia, to be borne by
the US. Europe maintains that it will not use Russian hot air. Whether that position will hold
through the end of the Kyoto commitment period is yet to be seen, but again this appears to be
an unwillingness to follow through on the burden redistribution agreement in the original deal.
The large redistribution implicit in the Kyoto Protocol as originally negotiated is just the
situation where trading would have been highly beneficial. From the evidence to date on
international implementation of climate policy it is not clear that agreements with large
redistribution goals are sustainable. In the end, the value of emissions trading as a policy
instrument for international agreements should be judged on its ability to actually accomplish
burden-sharing goals (while achieving cost effectiveness), as compared with alternative policy
approaches.
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